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In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority 
within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager 
makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to 
better exploit the information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives 
to gather information in the first place. Both effects of monitoring are influenced by the 
interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirms the theoretical predictions 
that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the level of interest alignment. We 
also find evidence for hidden costs of control and preferences for control, but these have no 
substantial effects on organizational outcomes. 
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Numerous in°uential theoretical papers show that, in a variety of strategic situations, more
information may hurt an individual. The underlying intuition is that if it common knownledge
that an individual is better informed, this may change the behavior of the other individuals.
This change in behavior can be detrimental to the better informed individual. Consequently,
rational individuals may stay ignorant for strategic reasons.
One situation where strategic ignorance is likely to play a key motivational role is the e®ective
delegation of decision rights within organizations.1 This argument is formally developed in
a pioneering contribution by Aghion and Tirole (1997). In their model a worker rightly fears
to be overruled by his manager only if the latter is well-informed about the consequences
of the operational decisions. This fear thwarts the worker's incentives to gather important
information. An uninformed manager can credibly commit not to overrule, since she does
not know the appropriate operational decision. Realizing that his preferred decision will be
implemented, the worker has stronger incentives to gather information. Strategic ignorance
can thus be a crucial tool to delegate e®ective control over decisions - called real authority -
to lower level employees.
The present paper investigates strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority in a
controlled laboratory experiment. We consider the following adapted version of Aghion and
Tirole (1997). A manager hires a worker to screen several potentially pro¯table investment
projects. The payo®s associated with these di®erent projects are initially unknown to both
manager and worker. The exact strategic interaction between manager and worker runs as
follows. First, the manager decides whether or not to monitor the worker at some costs.2
1The notion that less information may be bene¯cial has also been used in the analysis of vertical integration
in Riordan (1990) and privatization in Schmidt (1996). Further, Gul (2001) shows in a hold-up context that less
information may be bene¯cial for an individual as asymmetric information improves the investment incentives
for other individuals. In ¯nance Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Park and Shen (2008) demonstrate that
a lack of information allows lenders to credibly commit not to re¯nance projects. This reduces problems of
moral hazard and adverse selection from the borrowers' side.
2The binary monitoring choice can be interpreted as choosing between a more and a less e±cient monitoring
technology. Cremer (1995) develops a related model along these lines. Alternatively, the binary choice can
be interpreted as choosing between delegating the monitoring to a supervisor versus doing the monitoring
yourself; see Strausz (1997). In reduced form the binary monitoring choice also represents the choice between
a large and a small span of control as in Aghion and Tirole (1997).
2Second, the worker observes the manager's monitoring decision and then decides whether to
gather costly information on the projects or not. If the worker collects information, he learns
the payo®s of each of the projects. Otherwise he does not learn anything. No matter whether
the worker is informed or not, he next recommends a project to the manager. Thirdly, the
manager observes whether the worker has gathered information. He also observes the latter's
recommendation. The manager ¯nally decides which project to implement.
The manager's information when deciding on which project to implement depends on her
monitoring choice, the information gathering choice of the worker, and the recommended
project. If the worker does not gather information, he and the manager never receive any
information, independent of whether the manager monitors or not. If the worker does gather
information and the manager monitors, the manager receives the same information as the
worker. Matters are more complicated if the worker gathers information and the manager
does not monitor. We consider two variations in our experiment: under \hard information"
the manager can verify any information presented by the worker. She then learns the payo®s
associated with the recommended project. The payo®s associated with the other projects are
not revealed to the manager. Under \soft information" the manager never learns the payo®s
of any project, but only sees which project is recommended by the worker.
Parameters are chosen such that a manager who does not monitor the worker follows the
worker's recommendation if the latter recommends his - the worker's - most preferred project.
Our experimental design thus captures the essential observation by Aghion and Tirole (1997)
in the sense that the manager's decision whether or not to monitor is governed by two oppos-
ing forces. If the worker gathers information, monitoring allows the manager to push through
her most preferred project instead of the one most preferred by the worker. But since the
worker anticipates that he will be overruled, monitoring reduces the worker's incentives to
gather information. The strength of these e®ects, and thus equilibrium behavior, depend on
the interest alignment between manager and worker. As our main treatment variation we
therefore consider three di®erent levels of interest alignment. Under \full interest alignment"
the manager does not monitor since an informed worker recommends the project that is pre-
ferred by both. Under \strong interest alignment" the manager monitors since he can thus
implement his most preferred project without destroying the worker's incentives to gather
information. Under \weak interest alignment" the manager does not monitor as this would
discourage the worker's information gathering. Theory thus predicts that monitoring only
3occurs when interest alignment is strong, whereas there is no monitoring under full and weak
interest alignment.
Our main result is as follows. Monitoring rates follow the non-monotonic pattern predicted
by theory. In somewhat prosaic terms, we ¯nd that managers are more likely to monitor their
lukewarm friends than their foes. The main driving force here is that monitoring decreases
the worker's incentives to gather information if preferences are weakly aligned. In line with
standard theory, we thus obtain strong empirical evidence for the motivational costs of con-
trol.
Our data also suggest that some subjects exhibit a behavioral inclination for keeping control.
A priori we expected that managers have a natural preference for monitoring, especially when
interests are more dispersed. One reason for this is that, in non-strategic situations, people
frequently appear to be guided by an information bias: they display a positive willingness to
pay for irrelevant or even harmful information.3 Another intuitive reason is that in practice
managers often seem to display a preference for keeping control. Rather than emphasizing
the perils of lost control, the popular business press like Manzoni and Barsoux (1998) and
Herzberg (2003) thus frequently warns for the negative consequences of \micromanagement,"
where managers closely observe and control their employees. Careful case studies like Foss
(2003) provide illustrative evidence suggesting that meddling with subordinates' decisions
is very tempting for top management, even though it can lead to severe losses in employee
motivation.
Because behavioral preferences for keeping control are likely to be linked to the perceived
informativeness of the situation, we vary in our experiment whether recommendations of the
workers are based on hard or soft information. In the model of Aghion and Tirole (1997,
p.7) equilibrium predictions are essentially the same in both scenarios. This also holds in our
setup since under both information structures the worker has an incentive to recommend his
most preferred project. In the most plausible equilibrium of the cheap-talk recommendation-
game with soft information, an uninformed manager infers that the recommended project
equals the worker's most preferred one. If managers have a preference for control, however,
one would expect monitoring rates to be higher under soft than under hard information.
This is the case because monitoring then provides managers with relatively more { though
3See for example Loewenstein, Moore, and Weber (2006) for experimental evidence.
4essentially useless { information. We indeed ¯nd that managers are more likely to monitor
when information is soft than when information is hard, irrespective of the level of interest
alignment. However, the increase in monitoring is statistically signi¯cant only when prefer-
ences are fully aligned. We thus conclude that our experiment produces tentative empirical
evidence for the existence of preferences for control.
Our experiment also contributes to the literature on the behavioral consequences of exert-
ing control. Whereas our design focuses on the \overt costs of control," Falk and Kosfeld
(2006) show in an important recent contribution that there may also exist so-called \hid-
den costs of control." In their experiment control lowers workers' intrinsic motivation to
exert e®ort to such an extent so that the predicted bene¯ts of control are more than nulli-
¯ed. In the treatment with strong interest alignment we in fact ¯nd that monitoring reduces
information gathering (albeit di®erences are insigni¯cant). Further, information gathering
rates of monitored workers are lower under strong interest alignment as compared to full
interest alignment, even though in both treatments monitoring should not discourage infor-
mation gathering. Our data are thus mildly supportive for the argument by Falk and Kosfeld.
However, our results actually also point to the existence of \hidden returns of control." In our
treatment with full interest alignment, monitoring signi¯cantly increases workers' inclination
to gather information. This holds although standard theory predicts that monitoring should
have no impact. A plausible explanation for this ¯nding is that with full interest alignment
workers do not consider being monitored as being controlled. The manager rather signals
that she is willing to bear some costs to make sure that the mutually preferred project is cho-
sen. Monitoring can then be seen as \supportive." When preferences are not fully aligned,
monitoring provides managers with the opportunity to opportunistically overrule workers'
recommendations. Being monitored - and the experience of being overruled - can then be
interpreted as being controlled. This reduces worker motivation.4
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss further related experimental
literature. In Section 3 we describe our model of delegation and formally derive the theoretical
4Our ¯ndings thus support the existing experimental evidence on the hidden bene¯ts of control. For
example, Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) ¯nd that sanctions that are perceived as sel¯sh may have a negative
e®ect on altruistic cooperation, whereas sanctions that are perceived as fair do not a®ect altruistic cooperation
or may even enhance cooperation. Ariely, Kamenica, and Prelec (2008) show in their experiment that if
monitoring is perceived as interest in the work done, it may increase worker motivation.
5predictions. In Section 4 we present the details of our experimental design, while in Section 5
we report our results. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Further Related Literature
Apart from the connected papers discussed in the introduction, our paper also contributes
to an emerging experimental literature on strategic ignorance in bargaining contexts. If two
parties in a bargaining game make simultaneous claims regarding the surplus division, valu-
able trades are lost if claims are incompatible. Such bargaining break-downs can be avoided
if one party makes its claim knowing already the claim by the other. But more information
reduces the bargaining power of the informed party, because the uninformed party e®ectively
becomes ¯rst mover and thus can formulate a take-it-or-leave-it claim. In their ultimatum
game experiment, Poulsen and Tan (2007) indeed show that information about the accep-
tance threshold set by one party back¯res for the informed party, although the overall e®ect is
small due to the presence of social preferences. Poulsen and Roos (2010) further test whether
subjects in a Nash demand game understand that more information can hurt. They ¯nd that
subjects learn to avoid harmful information. In the above experiments more information
hurts a party as it weakens its bargaining position. In our setup more information { more
monitoring { puts the manager in too strong a position. The latter only hurts the manager if
the worker anticipates that he will be overruled, and therefore does not gather information.
Although the strategic situation is thus di®erent, our results corroborate the existing evidence.
Our experiment further connects to Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening (2010) who focus on the
motivational consequences of formal delegation. In their setup the manager can credibly
commit to delegate the ¯nal decision to the worker. We are more sympathetic to Baker,
Gibbons, and Murphy (1999) who argue on p.56 that \ ...subordinates' decisions rights are
loaned not owned." The ¯nal decision right thus always resides at the top of an organization.5
In our experiment the manager can thus e®ectively delegate decision rights only by purposely
remaining ignorant. Although formal delegation is not possible in our setup, the patterns
of delegation that we ¯nd are actually more consistent with the predictions by Aghion and
Tirole than the patterns of delegation found by Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening (2010). A second
major di®erence between the two studies is our approach towards understanding subjects'
preferences for control. In both papers we observe a tendency towards too little delegation.
5This view is also supported by the case study of Foss (2003).
6But only we vary whether information is hard or soft. This allows us to establish a causal
link between the informativeness of the situation and subjects' behavioral inclination to keep
too much control.
3 Model
Our model of delegation adapts the pioneering contribution by Aghion and Tirole (1997)
for implementation in a laboratory experiment. In their model a manager and a worker
simultaneously decide how much to invest in a costly and stochastic information gathering
technology. The worker only gets real authority if he does receive information while the
manager happens to receive no informative signal on the projects. We make the following
adaptations to get a clean experimental test of the essential mechanism from Aghion and
Tirole (1997). First, managers and workers make binary information gathering choices. This
simpli¯es comparisons when analyzing the impact of information gathering by the manager on
the information gathering by the worker. Second, managers ¯rst decide whether to monitor
their worker or not; upon seeing their choices workers then decide whether to gather infor-
mation on the investment projects or not. We can therefore directly see whether monitoring
by managers discourages information gathering by workers. Thirdly, the information that
managers and workers receive is fully determined by their behavior. Since no chance moves
are involved, we need not worry that subjects make mistakes when dealing with probabilities.
In the following we describe our theoretical setup in more detail.
3.1 Baseline Model of Delegation
Consider a ¯rm that consists of a manager and a worker. In this ¯rm some investment
project k 2 f1;2;::;Kg must be implemented. Projects di®er in the payo®s they yield to
manager and worker. The sets of possible payo®s are M = fm1;m2;::;mKg for the manager
and W = fw1;w2;::;wKg for the worker. There is a one-to-one correspondence between
these sets of payo®s generating exactly K distinct payo® combinations. There is also a one-
to-one correspondence between these payo® combinations and the investment projects, so
that each payo® combination is connected with exactly one investment project. Manager
and worker know the possible payo® combinations, but they initially do not know which
payo® combination is connected to which investment project. There are K! di®erent ways of
assigning the K payo® combinations to the K investment projects, and initially each of these
K! possible assignments is equally likely. Formally, the assignment of payo® combinations
7to the investment projects depends on an initially unknown state of the world µ 2 £, with
£ = f1;2;:::;K!g, where the prior probability for any the state of the world equals 1=K!.
Given state of the world µ project k yields payo®s fm(k;µ) to the manager and payo®s fw(k;µ)
to the worker.
3.2 Sequence of Actions and Information
Within ¯rms the information generation process is decentralized, whereas the manager always
keeps formal authority. For this reason decision rights might have to be e®ectively delegated
to the worker to improve implementation decisions and incentives to gather information. The
interaction between manager and worker is as follows. The manager ¯rst chooses whether
to monitor the worker or not. Monitoring costs the manager Á > 0. After observing the
monitoring decision, the worker decides whether to collect information or not. Collecting
information costs the worker Ã > 0. If the worker collects information, he learns the state
of the world µ 2 £. Otherwise, he learns nothing. The worker then recommends one of the
projects r 2 f1;2;::;Kg to the manager. The manager observes the recommendation and
implements a project.
The information the manager holds after receiving the worker's recommendation depends on
her monitoring choice and the worker's information gathering choice. If the worker gathers
no information, the manager never has any information on any project. This holds no matter
whether the manager monitors the worker or not. If the worker gathers information, the
information of the manager depends on her monitoring choice. If she monitors the worker,
she has the same information as the worker. She then knows the state of the world µ and
thus the payo®s of all investment projects. If she does not monitor the worker, she has
information only on the project that is recommended by the worker. She therefore knows
the payo®s fm(r;µ) and fw(r;µ) belonging to the recommended project r but not the state
of the world µ.
3.3 Interest Alignment
In our experiment we are interested in how behavior changes as we change the interest
alignment of the manager and the worker. Intuitively speaking, interests are aligned if both
manager and worker want the same project to be implemented. We formalize this notion
as follows. We assume that the sets of payo®s M and W have unique maxima. Let mm be
the resulting payo® for the manager if her most preferred project is implemented. De¯ne ww
8analogously. Given that the manager gets her most preferred project we are interested in the
resulting payo® for the worker. Thus, let wm be the payo® for the worker if the implemented
project is most preferred by the manager. Equally, let mw be the payo® for the manager if
the implemented project is most preferred by the worker. We de¯ne the vector
(mm ¡ mw;ww ¡ wm) (1)
as our inverse measure for the interest alignment between manager and worker. It is two-
dimensional because collapsing our measure into one dimension implies that in strategically
di®erent situations - with di®erent theoretical predictions - the interest alignment between
worker and manager could be the same. A draw-back of our two-dimensional measure is that
some strategic situations cannot be ordered.6
3.4 Equilibrium Concept and Beliefs
In the above dynamic game the manager has incomplete information on the projects' payo®s
if she does not monitor and the worker gathers information. Given the recommended project
the manager has to form beliefs about the state of the world. The relevant equilibrium con-
cept is thus perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This implies the following. Whenever manager
or worker make decisions without information on the projects - monitoring by the manager,
information gathering by the worker, and project recommendation by an uninformed worker -
beliefs remain unchanged. However, the manager must update her beliefs after receiving a
recommendation by an informed worker. Let p(µ0;r;fm(r;µ);fw(r;µ)) be her posterior beliefs
that the state of the world equals µ0 after the informed worker has recommended project r
while the state of the world equals µ. This belief depends on the state of the world µ but
only via the revealed payo®s of the recommended project; it also depends on the equilibrium
recommendation decisions by the worker.
In the following we intuitively describe equilibrium behavior of manager and worker; we will
derive exact predictions for the version of the model used in the experiment. We assume that
the utility of manager and worker is their payo® from the implemented investment project
minus their monitoring or information gathering costs.
6For example, Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening (2010) consider two treatments PLOW and PHIGH in which our
measures of interest alignment are (20,5) and (5,20). These two treatments thus cannot be ordered according
to our criterion.
93.5 Implementation Decisions and Delegation of Real Authority
Proceeding by backwards induction, the equilibrium project implementation choices of the
manager are as follows. Suppose ¯rst that the worker does not gather information. Since
the manager has no information on the projects, any implementation decision is optimal and










wi = ¹ w (2)
for the manager and the worker, respectively. Suppose second that the worker gathers infor-
mation while the manager monitors the worker. The manager then has full information on
all projects and implements a project that yields her the highest payo® mm and the worker
the payo® wm. Suppose ¯nally that the worker gathers information while the manager does
not monitor the worker. The manager then sees the payo®s of the recommended project r
only. Together with the equilibrium recommendation choice this reveals some information
on the state of the world. The manager now has to decide whether she wants to follow the









Otherwise, she implements a project k that yields the maximum expected utility given the
posterior belief. The implemented project yields her the highest expected payo® given her
updated beliefs.
Monitoring a®ects the distribution of formal and real authority as follows. The manager
always has formal authority - she makes the project implementation decision. If the worker
gathers information and the manager monitors, she keeps real authority. The reason is that
she implements her most preferred project, and there is nothing the worker can do about this
as his recommendation has no impact on the implementation choice. If the manager does not
monitor, she transfers some real authority to the worker. The reason is that the worker can
choose what information to reveal to the manager by recommending a project. The worker
now has some real authority since he can in°uence the ¯nal implementation choice.
In Aghion and Tirole (1997) there exists a project that yields the manager a very low payo® in
case of implementation. An uninformed manager thus follows the worker's recommendation
if an informed worker always proposes his most preferred project. Transforming (3) this
10implies
mw > ¹ m: (4)
We take up this assumption, which essentially imposes a minimum level of interest alignment
between manager and worker. If the worker gathers information while the manager does not
monitor, the worker thus receives all real authority since he can e®ectively implement his
most preferred project. This yields the manager payo® mw and the worker payo® ww.
3.6 Information Gathering and Delegation as Worker Empowerment
Building on the implementation choices of the manager, we can now investigate the recom-
mendation behavior and information acquisition choice of the worker. If the worker has not
gathered information, his recommendation has no informational content and he and the man-
ager receive expected payo®s ¹ m and ¹ w. If the worker gathers information and the manager
monitors him, the manager implements her preferred project and the worker receives payo®
wm. Finally, if the worker gathers information and the manager does not monitor him, he
can implement his most preferred project since by assumption the manager follows his rec-
ommendation. The worker then receives payo® ww. The worker then gathers information






wm ¡ Ã if the manager monitors
ww ¡ Ã if the manager does not monitor.
(5)
It is crucial to note that the incentives to gather information depend on whether the manager
monitors the worker or not. Monitoring reduces the incentives to gather information by
ww ¡ wm: (6)
This decrease in incentives can result in a loss of initiative as discussed by Aghion and Tirole
(1997) and Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999).
3.7 Monitoring and Loss of Control
We ¯nally turn to the monitoring choice of the manager. Whether it is optimal for the man-
ager to monitor depends crucially on whether monitoring discourages information gathering
by the worker. There are three cases. First, suppose the worker does not gather information
no matter whether the manager monitors or not. In this case the manager always takes
an uninformed decision. To save costs the manager optimally refrains from monitoring the
worker. Second, suppose the worker gathers information no matter whether he is monitored
11or not. If the manager monitors, she then gets her most preferred project and thus payo®
mm. If she does not monitor, the worker manages to push through his most preferred project
and the manager gets payo® mw. The manager then monitors the worker only if
mm ¡ mw ¸ Á: (7)
In this situation the manager loses payo®s mm¡mw by delegating real authority to the worker;
this is the consequence of her loss of control as discussed by Aghion and Tirole (1997) and
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999). Finally, suppose the worker gathers information if and
only if he is not monitored. If the manager monitors, the worker gathers no information. The
manager then makes an uninformed choice and gets expected payo® ¹ m. In addition she incurs
the monitoring costs Á. If the manager does not monitor, the worker gathers information and
recommends his most preferred project. The manager then gets payo® mw which exceeds the
expected payo® resulting from an uninformed implementation decision by assumption (4).
3.8 Strategic Ignorance and Interest Alignment
In her decision whether or not to monitor the worker, the manager thus has to take into
account two e®ects. First, monitoring reduces the worker's incentives to gather information
by (6). Second, monitoring allows the manager to push through her most preferred project
in case the worker gathers information.7 In this case the manager gains
mm ¡ mw: (8)
Both these e®ects depend on the interest alignment. On the one hand, the reduction in
incentives to gather information (6) decreases in the interest alignment when keeping the
payo®s mm and mw for the manager ¯xed. This makes monitoring more attractive. On the
other hand, the gains from keeping control (8) also decrease in the interest alignment when
keeping the payo®s ww and wm for the worker ¯xed. This makes monitoring less attractive.
Comparative static predictions result from these two countervailing e®ects, thus equilibrium
monitoring decisions can depend on the interest alignment in a non-monotonic way. We test
exactly such non-monotone comparative static predictions in our experiment.
3.9 Preference for Control: Soft versus Hard Information
As argued in the introduction, empirical research suggests that subjects might have a behav-
ioral preference for keeping control or gathering information. For once, subjects might enjoy
7In our model monitoring does not give the manager useful decision making power in case the worker does
not gather information - in that case the manager must make an uninformed choice.
12being in control, or their monitoring behavior might be triggered by an instinct to gather
information whenever possible. To investigate such behavioral preferences for control, we
adapt the above model so that managers might be more tempted to monitor because this
provides them with relatively more information. However, to isolate the potential impact of
a behavioral bias, the additional information in the adapted model is useless unless subjects
have a preference for control. The only di®erence to the original setup lies in the information
that is available to the manager if she chose not to monitor and the worker chose to collect
information. In the original setup - we call it hard information - the manager observes the
actual payo®s of the proposed project. In the adapted setup - we call it soft information -
the manager no longer observes the payo®s of the proposed project. We thus introduce cheap
talk between informed worker and uninformed manager.
Although the strategic situation is di®erent under hard and soft information, we argue that
economic outcomes should be the same if subjects have no preference for control. In the cheap-
talk sub-game between uninformed manager and informed worker there are many equilibria;
in particular there exists a babbling equilibrium in which the worker makes a random sugges-
tion, and the manager makes a random implementation decision. Since the recommendation
of the worker has then no information content, implementing a project at random is optimal
for the manager. Given that the recommended project has no impact on the implementation
decisions, randomly recommending a project is optimal for the worker. Yet given assumption
(4) there also exists an equilibrium in which the worker always proposes his most preferred
project and the manager follows the recommendation. We expect this equilibrium to be
played, a conjecture that can also be tested with the data. Equilibrium predictions for the
delegation models with hard and soft information are then the same. However, if we see
that monitoring rates are higher under soft than under hard information, this suggests that
subjects have a preference for control.
4 Experimental Design
4.1 Parameters and Equilibrium Predictions
In our experiment we test the non-monotonic impact of the interest alignment of manager
and worker on equilibrium monitoring and information gathering decisions. We consider
three treatments: full, strong and weak interest alignment. In all treatments there are three
investment projects, while B = W = f15;80;100g so that bb = ww = 100 and ¹ b = ¹ w = 65.
13Table 1 shows the possible payo® combinations of the investment projects for each treatment
separately, and which projects are preferred by manager and worker.
Table 1: Payo® Combinations in Treatments
Treatment Manager Preferred Worker Preferred Others
Full Alignment (100,100) (80,80) (15,15)
Strong Alignment (100,80) (80,100) (15,15)
Weak Alignment (100,15) (80,100) (15,80)
Note: the table shows the possible payo® combinations. The ¯rst entry corresponds
to the payo® for the manager, the second entry corresponds to the payo® for the
worker.
The inverse measures for the alignment of interest are thus (0,0) in full alignment, (20,20) in
strong alignment, and (20,85) in weak alignment. Our measure of interest alignment therefore
generates a clear ordering. In the treatments with strong and weak interest alignment, the
manager actually gets the same payo® if the workers implements his most preferred project.
The gains of keeping control as measured in (8) thus equals 20 in both treatments. However,
the loss of incentive as measured in (6) strongly increases from 20 to 85. The monetary costs
for monitoring Á and information gathering Ã are 10 in all treatments.
Given these parameters the theory generates the following predictions. With full interest
alignment both manager and worker have the same most preferred project. The manager
thus implements the worker's most preferred project. Since the worker is never overruled, his
incentives to gather information are not a®ected by whether the manager monitors him or not.
The worker gathers information since ww¡Ã = 100¡10 > 65 = ¹ w. As the worker implements
the manager's most preferred project anyway, the manager does not monitor in equilibrium
to save costs. With strong interest alignment an informed manager implements her most
preferred project. However, the costs of gathering information are su±ciently low so that
the worker nevertheless has incentives to gather information even if he is monitored because
wb ¡ Ã = 80 ¡ 10 > 65 = ¹ w. It is then optimal for the manager to monitor the worker as
ww¡wb = 100¡80 > 10 = Á. Under weak alignment an informed manager again implements
her most preferred project, but this time this really hurts the worker. Consequently, the
14worker only gathers information if the manager abstains from monitoring since wb ¡ Ã =
15¡10 < 65 = ¹ w. Because the manager otherwise has to make an uninformed implementation
decision, it is optimal for her not to monitor the worker. Under weak alignment we should
thus observe that the manager uses strategic ignorance to e®ectively delegate real authority
to the worker. These equilibrium predictions are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Equilibrium Predictions in Treatments
Treatment Monitoring Information Gathering Discouragement
Full Alignment No Yes No
Strong Alignment Yes Yes No
Weak Alignment No Yes Yes
Note: equilibrium predictions are based on the assumption that subjects maximize their monetary
payo®s. Discouragement means that monitoring by managers discourages information gathering by
workers.
Procedures
For each treatment we ran three sessions. Each session contained 18 or 20 participants.
Overall 170 subjects participated in the experiment. The subject pool was the undergrad-
uate student population of the University of Amsterdam. Most of them were students in
economics (58%). The experiment was programmed using the z-tree programming package
by Fischbacher (2007).
Each session consisted of four parts. Subjects were informed about this at the beginning of
the experiment, but the subjects did not learn anything about the content of the di®erent
parts until the part actually started. After completing the instructions of part 1 and an-
swering some control questions, each subject learned his role (either Manager or Worker).
Throughout the experiment subjects kept the same role. The experiment was framed in an
organizational setting. Hence, in the experiment we used the same phrasing as here. In total
the ¯rst two parts of each session contained 30 periods. The experiment used a stranger
design. Each period the manager and the worker were anonymously and randomly matched.
In each session we had two matching groups of 8 or 10 subjects. This yielded six independent
observations per treatment.
15The ¯rst part contained 20 periods in which subjects played the baseline model with hard
information as explained in Section 3. At the end of each period, a summary of the managers'
and worker's decisions and the resulting payo® in that period was shown to the subjects. The
second part contained 10 periods in which subjects played the model with soft information.
The interest alignment was kept constant. We also conducted two additional parts in which
we tried to measure subjects' preferences for control more directly. Unfortunately, our e®orts
were in vain. We brie°y come back to these parts only in the conclusion.
In part one and two the payo® to each subject in each period equalled the number of points
of the implemented project minus possible costs the subjects incurred by becoming informed.
The overall payo® for each subject equals the sum of points earned over all periods. The
conversion rate was 150 points for 1 euro. Apart from that the subjects received 5 euro for
¯lling in the questionnaire. Subjects earned on average 23 euros for 90-100 minutes. Sample
instructions are included at the end of the paper.
5 Results
In this section we ¯rst investigate how the interest alignment a®ects aggregate behavior of
managers and workers. Detailed summary statistics can be found in Tables 3 and 4 in the
appendix. Some observations are immediate. First, managers' monitoring decisions follow the
pattern as predicted by theory: under strong interest alignment managers keep real authority,
whereas under full and weak interest alignment they delegate real authority to workers by
remaining ignorant. Second, monitoring harms information acquisition only in the treatment
with weak interest alignment. Managers' monitoring behavior thus seems to be an optimal
response to workers information gathering. Since managers delegate real authority under
weak interest alignment, workers by and large gather information in all treatments. Finally,
monitoring occurs quite often under full interest alignment. Moreover, changing from hard
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Figure 1: Monitoring
In the remaining section we look at the above ¯ndings in greater detail. We ¯rst study
managers' monitoring behavior and then investigate workers' information gathering decisions
conditional on whether managers have kept real authority or not. We next look at the project
recommendation and implementation stage. Finally, we analyze how the type of information
(hard or soft) impacts on workers' monitoring choices.
5.1 Monitoring behavior
Figure 1 summarizes the monitoring behavior conditional on both interest alignment and on
whether information is hard or soft. The exact monitoring fractions can be found in Table 5 in
the appendix. Monitoring rates follow the non-monotonic comparative statics as predicted by
theory: with hard information monitoring increases from 29% to 75% as we change from full
to strong interest alignment, and monitoring decreases to 19% as we change to weak interest
alignment. The pattern is the same with soft information. A succinct way to reformulate the
data is that managers are indeed more likely to monitor their lukewarm friends than their foes.
We next verify whether the observed di®erences are statistically signi¯cant. To take account
of the interdependencies between subjects from the same matching group, all non-parametric
tests are based on the comparison of matching group averages. Table 6 in the appendix
17reports the outcomes of the performed between-group comparisons based on Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests. In all tables most numbers are rounded, where a reported p-value of 0.00 indicates
that the p-value is less than 0.005.
The p-values reveal that managers are signi¯cantly more likely to monitor when interest
alignment is strong than when interest alignment is weak. Moreover, monitoring fractions
do not di®er between full and weak interest alignment with hard information. The single
deviation from standard theory is that the monitoring rate in case of full interest alignment
is very high at 53% when information is soft even once learning e®ects are accounted for. In
fact, the high monitoring rate is then not signi¯cantly lower than the monitoring rate of 74%
under strong alignment and it is signi¯cantly higher than the monitoring rate of 20% under
weak alignment. We summarize our ¯ndings as follows.
Result 1 (Monitoring). (a) Monitoring occurs signi¯cantly more often under strong interest
alignment than under weak interest alignment. (b) In case of soft information, the monitoring
rate under full interest alignment is well above the predicted rate of zero and does not di®er
signi¯cantly from the observed rate under strong interest alignment.
5.2 Information Gathering
To better understand managers' monitoring behavior, we next turn to workers' information
gathering decisions. Since the information gathering is not sensitive to the information con-
dition, we pool observations from the parts where information is hard and soft. Figure 2
summarizes our ¯nding. The exact information gathering rates conditional on hard and soft
information plus all non-parametric tests can be found in Tables 7 and 8 in the appendix.
As predicted by theory monitoring signi¯cantly decreases workers' information gathering un-
der weak interest alignment. The di®erence is not only statistically, but also economically
highly signi¯cant. The loss of initiative resulting from monitoring makes it optimal for man-
agers to remain ignorant and abstain from monitoring.
Our experiment sheds new light on what Falk and Kosfeld (2006) call \hidden costs of con-
trol." These authors show in their experiment that exerting control can erode individuals'
intrinsic motivation to cooperate. In our experiment an aversion to being monitored could
increase the disincentive e®ect of monitoring. In consequence, monitoring might discourage
























Full Alignment Strong Alignment Weak Alignment
Information Gathering
Not Monitored Monitored
Figure 2: Information Gathering
then maximizes workers' expected payo®s. We ¯nd that monitoring reduces information
gathering under strong interest alignment with hard information from 77% to 60%, but this
e®ect is statistically not signi¯cant. There is no such e®ect with soft information. Infor-
mation gathering is unexpectedly infrequent under strong interest alignment as compared to
information gathering under full interest alignment, in particular when managers monitor.
The non-parametric tests reported in Table 8 indeed show that monitored workers are sig-
ni¯cantly less likely to acquire information under strong interest alignment than under full
interest alignment. This stands in contrast to the theoretical predictions according to which
we should observe no treatment di®erence.
Although our data is thus mildly supportive for the presence of hidden costs of control under
strong interest alignment, the observed behavior under full interest alignment suggests that
there might also be hidden \bene¯ts of control." In this case monitoring actually increases
workers' willingness to gather information.8 A potential explanation here is that, given that
interests are fully aligned, workers do not consider being monitored as being controlled.
Rather, monitoring signals managers' sincere interest in securing that the best project out-
come for both is implemented. By monitoring managers show that they are willing to bear
8The increase is statistically signi¯cant when information is hard but insigni¯cant when information is soft.
There are no learning e®ects.
19some costs as well as to make sure that the mutually preferred project is chosen. From that
perspective monitoring can be seen as \supportive." In contrast, when interests are not fully
aligned, being monitored may be interpreted by workers as being controlled, because it pro-
vides managers with the opportunity to overrule workers to their own private bene¯t. We
summarize our results as follows.
Result 2 (Information Gathering). (a) Under weak interest alignment, monitoring harms
information acquisition by workers. (b) Under full interest alignment, monitoring increases
workers' willingness to acquire information (only) when information is hard. (c) Under strong
interest alignment, monitoring leads to less information acquisition than under full interest
alignment.
5.3 Recommendation and Implementation
After describing the monitoring and information gathering decisions, we now turn to the
recommendation and implementation stage. The general overview depicted in Tables 3 and 4
in the appendix suggests that project implementation decisions are by and large as predicted.
In particular, managers typically can implement their most preferred project under strong
alignment, whereas workers manage to push through their most preferred project under weak
alignment. The delegation of real authority thus reacts to the interest alignment of managers
and workers as predicted by theory.
The above mentioned tables only describe the outcome of the recommendation and implemen-
tation stage. We next take a closer look at the actual proposals and project implementation
choices made. If the worker does not acquire information, his recommendation is based on
no information at all and thus e®ectively random. We therefore focus on the observations in
which the worker did acquire information. Under full interest alignment, the worker always
recommends the project that is best for both and his recommendation is always followed.
This holds irrespectively of whether he is monitored or not, and it also does not depend on
whether information is hard or soft.9 Recommendation and implementation decisions are
more dispersed when preferences diverge. Table 9 provides an overview of the choices then
9For the 520 observations under hard information (Part I) this is literally always the case. Under soft
information we observe only 2 exceptions out of 264 observations (in these the worker proposes the project
that yields 15 to both; in one of these cases the manager is informed as well and implements the project that
yields both 100).
20observed, showing that behavior is essentially consistent with the theoretical predictions.10
This indicates that managers' and workers' behavior in the cheap talk game with soft infor-
mation is largely consistent with an equilibrium in which workers always propose their most
preferred project and managers follow the recommendation.
Numerous experiments suggest that many individuals are not only interested in their own
payo®, but are also in°uenced by fairness or equity concerns. In the context of our exper-
iment, distributional fairness models like Fehr and Schmidt (1999) predict that su±ciently
inequity averse informed managers do not implement their favorite project if this really hurts
the worker. Intention based fairness models like Rabin (1993) or Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) might also suggest that informed managers reciprocate the kind action of workers -
gathering information - by not abusing their real authority. This is not what we observe in the
data. Even in the treatment with weak interest alignment, informed managers overrule work-
ers to increase their payo®s from 80 to 100 although this reduces the workers' payo®s from 100
to 15 and increases payo® inequality from 20 to 85. This behavioral pattern is particularly
striking with hard information, yet even with soft information 60% of monitoring managers
implement their favorite project. One reason for this ¯nding could be that our setup does
not trigger managers' fairness concerns: they think that since they have the power, it is ¯ne
to overrule their workers. Alternatively, managers with fairness concerns might refrain from
monitoring in the ¯rst place. The subsample of monitoring managers is then predominantly
sel¯sh and behaves accordingly. In any case, the data suggest that fairness concerns do not
have a strong impact on behavior in the recommendation and implementation stage.
Our results illustrate that ignorance (no monitoring) indeed serves a useful purpose as a
commitment device not to overrule the worker. The ¯nding that managers typically do not
monitor under weak interest alignment indicates that they see the strategic commitment
value of remaining uninformed. We summarize our ¯ndings as follows.
10Under strong interest alignment uninformed managers do not always follow workers' recommendations
as they implement the workers' most preferred project in only around 57% of the cases. In consequence,
dominated projects are sometimes implemented by uninformed managers. This happens less frequently under
weak interest alignment. Whether information is hard or soft does not seem to have any substantial impact
on this behavioral pattern.
21Result 3 (Recommendation and Implementation). (a) Under weak interest alignment project
implementation favors workers, whereas under strong interest alignment project implementa-
tion favors managers. (b) If managers do not monitor they typically follows their workers'
recommendations, whereas if managers monitor they typically overrule their worker to imple-
ment their favored project. (c) The type of information (hard or soft) has no e®ect on project
implementation decisions.
5.4 Preference for Control
So far we have discussed the behavioral consequences of changes in interest alignment. We
now investigate how managers' and workers' behavior depends on whether information is hard
or soft. Based on the existing literature, making information soft could trigger managers'
behavioral inclination to gather information. Figure 1 and Table 5 in the appendix illustrate
that managers are more likely to monitor when information is soft than when information
is hard. Irrespective of the level of interest alignment the monitoring frequency increases
when information becomes soft: it increases by 86% under full interest alignment, by 3%
under strong interest alignment, and by 39% under weak interest alignment. However, the
increase in monitoring is statistically signi¯cant only under full interest alignment. There are
no learning e®ects.
A tentative explanation here is that a preference for \control" boosts managers' incentives
to monitor when information is soft. Under full interest alignment this is not expected to
adversely a®ect the worker's subsequent information acquisition behavior, so the manager
can simply give in to her inclination to control without bearing costs beyond the direct costs
of monitoring. Under weak interest alignment monitoring destroys workers' incentives to
gather information. Since the strategic costs of monitoring are thus high, managers delegate
real authority to workers. Nevertheless, the increase in monitoring when moving from hard
to soft information is almost signi¯cant. Under strong alignment managers should monitor
anyway. Since there is little scope for control preference to impact behavior, it is perhaps
not surprising that we cannot observe a signi¯cant increase in monitoring.
Note that the observed increase in monitoring - especially under full interest alignment -
cannot be a response to changes in behavior in the information gathering or recommendation
and implementation stages. Tables 3, 4, and 9 in the appendix indicate that the type of infor-
mation (hard or soft) has no impact on behavior in the recommendation and implementation
22stage. Concerning the information gathering, signrank tests reveal that only one di®erence
out of twelve comparisons is statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level when comparing informa-
tion gathering fractions across information conditions from Table 7. Under strong interest
alignment the information acquisition fraction conditional on being monitored signi¯cantly
increases when information becomes soft and we consider the second halfs of the periods only
(p-value of 0.05). In absolute size the increase is relatively small, from 0:57 to 0:65. There is
no signi¯cant e®ect when we take all periods into account. We therefore conclude that the
type of information has a negligible impact on workers' information acquisition behavior.11
Since the type of information has no substantial e®ect on recommendation, implementation,
and information gathering behavior, the ¯nding that managers in the full alignment condition
monitor more under soft information than under hard information suggests a preference for
control, rather than being induced by a expected positive reaction of workers. We summarize
our ¯ndings as follows.
Result 4 (Preference for Control). (a) Changing the information from hard to soft increases
monitoring, but the e®ect is statistically signi¯cant only under full interest alignment. (b)
The increase in monitoring is not induced by an expected positive reaction of workers.
6 Conclusion
In this laboratory experiment we studied whether subjects use strategic ignorance to delegate
real authority. In a ¯rm a worker could gather information on investment projects, while a
manager ¯nally made the implementation decision. The manager could monitor the worker.
For once this allowed her to better exploit the information gathered by the worker. But
monitoring also reduced the worker's incentives to gather information in the ¯rst place. Both
e®ects of monitoring were in°uenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker.
Optimal monitoring therefore could depend non-monotonically on the interest alignment,
11At the 10% level three additional statistically signi¯cant di®erences are found. Under weak interest
alignment the information gathering fraction conditional on not being monitored is signi¯cantly higher after
soft information, both when we consider all periods (p-value of 0.08) or only the second halfs of each part
(p-value of 0.08). For the full alignment treatment the fraction conditional on being monitored is signi¯cantly
lower under soft information when we consider all periods (p-value of 0.09). Both e®ects make monitoring
less attractive for the manager under soft information as compared to hard information. These marginally
signi¯cant di®erences thus cannot explain why managers monitor more when information is soft than when
information is hard.
23which we changed in our experiment as our main treatment variation. The data con¯rms the
relationship between interest alignment and delegation as predicted by the theory of Aghion
and Tirole (1997). We also found mild empirical evidence for preferences for control and
hidden costs of control, but these had no substantial e®ects on organizational outcomes.
Management studies and the popular business press often argue that many executives are
overly inclined to meddle in subordinates' decision making, even though this frequently leads
to an enormous loss of employee motivation.12 Apart from changing the informativeness of
the strategic situation, we also tried to measure subjects' preferences for control more directly.
In a third part of the experiment, worker or manager again had to decide which project to
implement. As before both worker and manager knew the possible payo® combinations of
the projects, but neither of the two knew which payo® combination corresponded to which
project. In contrast to the previous parts, they now had no opportunity to collect any addi-
tional information on the investment projects. Whether worker or manager had the right to
choose the project was determined via a ¯rst-price auction. First, both worker and manager
simultaneously made a bid to buy the implementation decision right. Second, whoever made
the highest bid, had to pay his bid, but in turn acquired the right to decide which project
was implemented. The ¯nal part of the experiment was a questionnaire including a big ¯ve
personality test from psychology.
Unfortunately, the third part did not add anything to our analysis: even though we do observe
some bidding, the bidding behavior was not consistently connected to any prior delegation and
monitoring decisions. We concluded that a ¯rst-price auction was not a suitable mechanism
to elicit subject's willingness to make the implementation decision. Equally, the measures
from the big ¯ve personality test were uncorrelated to behavior in the experiment. Finding a
good experimental setup to directly measure subjects' preferences for control, and connecting
these measures to behavior in the laboratory and in the ¯eld, thus remain interesting topics
for future research.
12See Manzoni and Barsoux (1998), Herzberg (2003), and Foss (2003) as cited in the introduction. See also
the comments by Williamson (1996, pp.150-151) on the connection between undesirable managerial meddling
and desirable selective intervention.
24Appendix A: Tables
Aggregate Outcomes
Table 3: Outcomes (Hard Information)
Monitoring and Information Gathering Project Implemented
No Monitoring Monitoring
Treatment No Info Info No Info Info MÂ WÂ dÁ
Full Alignment 6:96 65:18 0:18 27:68 95:18 4:82
Strong Alignment 5:52 19:83 29:14 45:52 61:21 24:14 14:66
Weak Alignment 19:29 61:25 15:54 3:93 17:68 65:00 17:32
Note: percentage wise overview of outcomes. Predictions from standard theory in bold. MÂ
and WÂ refers to manager's and worker's best project, dÁ denotes a dominated project.
Table 4: Outcomes (Soft Information)
Monitoring and Information Gathering Project Implemented
No Monitoring Monitoring
Treatment No Info Info No Info Info MÂ WÂ dÁ
Full Alignment 4:64 43:21 1:07 51:07 95:71 4:21
Strong Alignment 8:28 14:14 24:83 52:76 67:24 17:24 15:52
Weak Alignment 9:29 64:29 22:86 3:57 18:21 62:14 19:64
Note: percentage wise overview of outcomes. Predictions from standard theory in bold. MÂ
and WÂ refers to manager's and worker's best project, dÁ denotes a dominated project.
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Table 5: Monitoring
Treatment Periods Hard Information Soft Information p-values
Full Alignment All 0:29 0:54 0:04
2nd Half 0:23 0:53 0:04
Strong Alignment All 0:75 0:77 0:75
2nd Half 0:74 0:74 0:75
Weak Alignment All 0:19 0:26 0:12
2nd Half 0:09 0:20 0:14
Note: Monitoring fractions. p-values from a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test based
on the distribution of matching group averages.
Table 6: Monitoring Treatment Di®erences
Treatment Comparison Periods Hard Information Soft Information
Full vs. Strong Alignment All 0:01 0:20
2nd Half 0:02 0:20
Full vs. Weak Alignment All 0:52 0:11
2nd Half 0:52 0:05
Strong vs. Weak Alignment All 0:00 0:00
2nd Half 0:00 0:00
Note: p-values from a Wilcoxon rank-sum test based on the distribution of matching group
averages.
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Table 7: Information Gathering
Treatment Periods Not Monitored Monitored p-values
Full Alignment All 0:89 (0:90) 0:99 (0:97) 0:04 (0:17)
2nd Half 0:94 (0:94) 1:00 (0:98) 0:09 (0:43)
Strong Alignment All 0:77 (0:62) 0:60 (0:67) 0:17 (0:89)
2nd Half 0:83 (0:67) 0:57 (0:65) 0:12 (0:69)
Weak Alignment All 0:77 (0:88) 0:17 (0:12) 0:03 (0:03)
2nd Half 0:79 (0:89) 0:02 (0:07) 0:03 (0:03)
Note: Information gathering fractions. p-values from Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
ranks test based on the distribution of matching group averages. Numbers without
brackets refer to the part with hard information; the corresponding numbers for the
part with soft information are in parentheses.
Table 8: Information Gathering Treatment Di®erences
Treatment Comparison Periods Not Monitored Monitored
Full vs. Strong Alignment All 0:42 (0:02) 0:00 (0:00)
2nd Half 0:80 (0:03) 0:00 (0:00)
Full vs. Weak Alignment All 0:04 (0:81) 0:00 (0:00)
2nd Half 0:02 (0:18) 0:00 (0:00)
Strong vs. Weak Alignment All 0:26 (0:02) 0:00 (0:00)
2nd Half 0:11 (0:05) 0:00 (0:00)
Note: p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests based on the distribution of matching
group averages. Numbers without brackets refer to the part with hard information;
the corresponding numbers for the part with soft information are in parentheses.
27Recommendation and Implementation
Table 9: Recommendation and Implementation
Treatment Monitoring Project Recommended Implemented
Strong Alignment No MÂ 0.07 (0.02) 0.26 (0.17)
WÂ 0.89 (0.90) 0.57 (0.56)
dÁ 0.04 (0.07) 0.17 (0.27)
Yes MÂ 0.24 (0.18) 0.97 (0.99)
WÂ 0.73 (0.78) 0.03 (0.01)
dÁ 0.03 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00)
Weak Alignment No MÂ 0.01 (0.02) 0.09 (0.11)
WÂ 0.98 (0.96) 0.84 (0.75)
dÁ 0.01 (0.02) 0.07 (0.14)
Yes MÂ 0.00 (0.00) 0.82 (0.60)
WÂ 0.95 (1.00) 0.18 (0.40)
dÁ 0.05 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Note: Fractions of recommended and implemented projects conditional on the worker be-
ing informed. MÂ and WÂ refers to manager's and worker's best project, dÁ denotes a
dominated project. Numbers without brackets refer to the part with hard information; the
corresponding numbers for the part with soft information are in parentheses.
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General Remarks  
 
The instructions for all three treatments were identical except for the payoff combinations of the 
three investment projects. These sample instructions are from the treatment with strong interest 
alignment. The current general remarks and the title were, of course, not included in the instructions 
for the experimental subjects. Instructions for the different parts of the experiment were handed out 
separately, and only after all subjects had completed the previous part or parts. Part 4 was a 





Thank you for participating in this experiment. The amount of money you earn depends upon the 
decisions you and the other participants make. Your earnings are given in points. The experiment 
consists of four parts. Your overall earnings equal the sum of your points in each part. The 
conversion rate is 150 points for 1 euro. We will pay out your overall earnings in cash after you 
have completed the entire experiment and filled out a final questionnaire. We ensure that your final 
earnings remain confidential: no other participant from the experiment will learn your final 
earnings. 
There are two types of participants: managers and workers. One half of the participants will be 
managers, and the remaining half will be workers. You will be randomly assigned one of these 
roles. Which role you have, you will learn at the start of the experiment. Your role will not change 
during the experiment. 
The experiment consists of four parts. This sheet contains the instructions for part one. Instructions 
for the next part follow after this part has been completed (and so on). Please do not communicate 
with other participants during the experiment. If you have a question, please raise your hand. The 
experimenter will then come to your table to answer your question in private. 
 
Part 1 of the Experiment 
 
General information 
The first part of the experiment consists of 20 project implementation decisions. For each project 
implementation decision, one manager and one worker are randomly paired. You are never paired with the same other participant twice in a row. You cannot predict when you will be paired with the 
same other participant again. 
In every project implementation decision, manager and worker face three projects (A,B,C) that can 
be implemented. These projects differ in the points that they yield manager and worker upon 
implementation. Three payoff combinations are possible. One project yields 80 points to manager 
and 100 points to worker, one project yields 100 points to manager and 80 points to worker and 
one project yields 15 points to manager and 15 points to worker. The problem is that manager 
and worker do not a priori know which payoff combination corresponds to which project.. Each 
period the payoff combinations are randomly assigned to project A, B and C. Thus over the periods 
project A corresponds to different payoff combinations etc. 
Before the manager finally decides which project to implement (either A, B, or C), the worker can 
decide whether to gather information on the payoffs of the projects or not, and the manager can 
decide whether to monitor the worker’s information gathering or not. Gathering information on the 
projects costs the worker 10 points. Monitoring the worker costs the manager 10 points.  
 
Sequence of Actions 
The precise timing of the decisions and the resulting distribution of information that follows from 
these decisions are as follows. There are four phases. 
Phase 1   
The manager chooses between Monitoring the worker and Not Monitoring the worker. 
Monitoring the worker costs the manager 10 points. 
Phase 2 
The worker observes the manager’s choice. He then chooses between Information and No 
Information. Information costs the worker 10 points. 
Depending on the worker’s information gathering decision, he may or may not learn the 
characteristics of the three projects. 
•  If the worker has chosen Information, the payoff characteristics of all three projects (A, B, 
and C) are revealed to him. 
•  If the worker has chosen No Information, no information about the projects is revealed to 
him. 
Phase 3 
The worker proposes a project to the manager, either A, B, or C. 
The manager observes which project the worker has proposed. 
Depending on the manager’s and the worker’s earlier decisions, additional information may be 
revealed to the manager.  
•  If the worker has chosen No Information, no information about the projects is revealed. 
•  If the worker has chosen Information and the manager has chosen No Monitoring, the 
manager learns the payoff characteristics of the proposed project only. 
•  If the worker has chosen Information and the manager has chosen Monitoring, the 
manager learns the payoff characteristics of all three projects. Phase 4 
The manager finally decides which project to implement, either A, B, or C. 
 
Payoff 
The number of points earned by manager and worker respectively are their points from the 
implemented project minus their respective costs of the monitoring decision (either 10 or 0 points) 
and the information gathering decision (either 10 or 0 points). 
The three possible payoff combinations of the projects are summarized in the table below 
  (100, 80)  (80, 100)  (15, 15) 
Manager 100  80  15 
Worker  80 100 15 
Your overall payoff from part 1 of the experiment is the sum of points earned in the 20 project 
implementation decisions. Part 2 of the Experiment 
 
The second part of the experiment consists of 10 project implementation decisions. As compared to 
part 1 the main difference is the amount of information that is revealed to the manager after the 
worker has gathered information and proposed a project. In this part, if the manager does not 
monitor the worker, he never learns anything about the payoff characteristics of the projects. In 
particular, this means that he also does not learn the characteristics of the project proposed by the 
worker. If the manager monitors the worker, he learns the payoff characteristics of all three projects 
if the worker chooses to gather information.  
 
The remainder of part 2 is identical to part 1. This means that for each project implementation 
decision you will be randomly paired with another participant. Again you are never paired with the 
same other participant twice in a row. You cannot predict when you will be paired with the same 
other participant again. You keep the same role as in part 1 of the experiment. 
 
Like in part 1, the manager can decide whether to monitor the worker or not. Monitoring the worker 
costs the manager 10  points. Then the worker observes the manager’s choice and can decide 
whether to learn the payoff characteristics of the projects (A, B, or C) or not. Gathering information 
on the projects costs the worker 10 points. After that the worker proposes a project to the manager 
(either A, B, or C). Finally, the manager decides which project to implement. The three possible 
payoff combinations of the projects are just as before: 
 
  (100, 80)  (80, 100)  (15, 15) 
Manager 100  80  15 
Worker  80 100 15 
 
The number of points earned by manager and worker respectively are their points from the 
implemented project minus their respective costs of the monitoring decision (either 10 or 0 points) 
and the information gathering decision (either 10 or 0 points). Your overall payoff from part 2 of 
the experiment is the sum of points earned in the 10 project implementation decisions. The overall 
payoff from part 2 is added to the overall payoff of part 1. Part 3 of the Experiment 
 
The third part of the experiment consists of 5 project implementation decisions. In every project 
implementation decision, manager and worker face three projects (A,B,C) that can be implemented. 
These projects differ in the points that they yield manager and worker upon implementation. As in 
the previous parts three payoff combinations are possible. One project yields 100 to manager and 80 
to worker, one project yields 80 to manager and 100 to worker and one project yields 15 to manager 
and 15 to worker. Both the manager and the worker do not know which payoff combination 
corresponds to which project and cannot obtain additional information about this. 
 
What also differs from the previous parts of the experiment is that an auction between the worker 
and the manager determines who has the right to choose which project is implemented. Both worker 
and manager simultaneously make a bid to buy the implementation decision right. The bid has to be 
an integer (0, 1, 2, 3, … etc); it cannot exceed 120. Whoever has made the highest bid, decides 
which project is implemented. If both manager and worker make the same bid, the decision right is 
randomly assigned to either the manager or the worker, with equal probability. Note that the 
decision maker chooses the project (either A, B, or C) without knowing which payoff combination 
corresponds to which project. After the project implementation decision has been made, manager 
and worker learn the payoffs of the project that will be implemented and observe the highest bid 
made for the decision right.  
 
The number of points earned by the decision maker are the points from the implemented project 
minus his bid. The other participant simply gets his points from the implemented project. Your 
overall payoff from part 3 of the experiment is the sum of points earned in the 5 project 
implementation decisions. The overall payoff from part 3 is added to the overall payoff of part 1 
and part 2.  
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